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The Citizens’ Revolution, the political process initiated in Ecuador with the presiden-
tial inauguration of Rafael Correa in 2007, initiated a radical transformation in the media 
comparable to other progressive governmental experiments in the region. The political 
process led by Correa has pursued a change in power relations and ownership, the intro-
duction of regulation, the demystification of the established media discourse, and an aban-
donment of the market as a guiding principle in the media. From the perspective of the 
equitable redistribution of media power, however, it is still an open process whose outcome 
is uncertain.
La Revolución Ciudadana, el proceso político iniciado en el Ecuador con la investidura 
presidencial de Rafael Correa en 2007, inició una transformación radical en los medios de 
comunicación comparables a otros experimentos gubernamentales progresistas de la 
región. El proceso político liderado por Correa ha buscado un cambio en las relaciones de 
poder y la propiedad, la introducción de la regulación, la desmistificación del discurso de 
los medios establecidos, y un abandono del mercado como principio rector en los medios de 
comunicación. Desde la perspectiva de la redistribución equitativa de poder de los medios, 
sin embargo, sigue siendo un proceso abierto cuyo resultado es incierto.
Keywords: Citizens’ Revolution, Ecuadorean politics, Mass media, Post-neoliberalism, 
Counterhegemony
One of the legacies of the period of neoliberalism in Latin America is anxi-
ety about the transformation of the media as instruments of power (PNUD, 
2004). Many of the governments of the region’s new left have linked their 
counterhegemonic orientations with post-neoliberal agendas and demands 
for democratization of the power of the media. Where progressive govern-
ments emerged after a severe crisis of representation or the collapse of the 
political system, as in Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, there was a 
radical politicization of the question of the media, including regular counter-
discourse deconstructing the interests and practices of the dominant media, 
discussion of constitutional reforms and new legal and regulatory frameworks, 
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attempts to alter the relationships of media ownership, and the promotion of 
public media as an alternative to the market. In contrast, where the left rose to 
government, as in Brazil, through a path of political-institutional compro-
mises, the emergence of a politicized counterhegemonic strategy was pre-
vented even though important governmental sectors might have preferred it. 
Apart from these common characteristics, the inflections, radicalism, and 
reach of these counterhegemonic attempts in the field of communication are 
linked to the political dynamics, actors, alliances, and political organizational 
resources available in particular contexts.
This article will describe the transformative offensive on the media launched 
by the Citizens’ Revolution, the political process initiated by Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador. It will examine the convergence of reformist agendas in the media 
sector and correísta discourse, the government’s relations with civil society 
actors engaged in the democratization of the public sphere, the constitutional 
and legal changes in the field of communication, the realpolitik of Correa’s 
media policy, and the shift in the balance of media power. This trajectory will 
allow some observations about the factors conditioning the Citizens’ 
Revolution’s counterhegemonic experiment at the level of political elites, the 
bureaucracy and institutions, and the society. In this context, the idea of coun-
terhegemonic media refers to a specific political orientation rather than to an 
effective and lasting democratization of access and power. The latter is still an 
open process, and it is far from clear how the media will be restructured, how 
power will be distributed within the sphere, and who will be the protagonists.
Some brief references to the political economy of Ecuador’s media when the 
Citizens’ Revolution came to power will provide a standard for evaluating the 
experiment. Ecuador is a relatively small media market and lacks a well-devel-
oped cultural industry. Decades of deregulation have created a number of con-
centrated media groups, and during the crisis of the political institutions their 
political and economic influence increased. After the 1990s, the weak and flex-
ible regulatory framework inherited from the military government of Guillermo 
Rodríguez Lara1 facilitated the incorporation of the business community into 
the regulatory and watchdog agencies, giving rise to self-reproducing prac-
tices, frequently illegal, and to new dominant actors. Therefore, the media envi-
ronment inherited by the Citizens’ Revolution was characterized by the 
dominance of the commercial sector (approximately 95 percent of the radio and 
television licenses), the virtual absence of public media (Ecuadorean National 
Radio, created in 1961 by José María Velasco Ibarra, was dismantled in the 
1990s), and a community media sector that (at least until 2002) was extremely 
limited by legal and operational obstacles. The structure of media ownership 
demonstrated horizontal concentration and overlapping of family networks 
and business conglomerates. Two newspapers represented approximately 65 
percent of national circulation: the Pérez Group’s El Universo, representing the 
political and economic elites of Guayaquil, and the traditional El Comercio de 
Quito, belonging to the Mantilla family. The family proprietors of these news-
papers and other print media tended to expand their interests into the electronic 
media, but none of them presided over multimedia groups with monopolistic 
tendencies such as Globo in Brazil or Clarín in Argentina. By 2007, 19 families 
controlled 287 of the 348 television licenses. There was less concentration in 
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radio, where 45 families controlled 60 percent of the concessions. In contrast to 
large markets with groups concentrated exclusively in media, there was a pre-
dominance of multimedia groups controlled by industrial, commercial, and, 
especially, financial interests.2 Six of the eight television networks with a 
national reach were directly or indirectly linked to banking interests. These 
networks dominated audiences and the advertising market (Becerra and 
Mastrini, 2009; CAF, 2009; CORAPE, 2008; Navas, 2011).
Since democratization and despite the dislocations that started with the fall 
of President Abdalá Bucaram, the media elites were supported by strong direct 
links and reciprocal accommodations with political actors, especially from the 
conservative camp. Similar links were observed between the local media, espe-
cially radio and print, and the regional political leadership. This regional cleav-
age appears to have gained importance in the structuring of the relationship 
between the media and political power. Many of the largest groups (the Pérez 
group, the Isaías group, the Alvarado Roca family) and the most influential 
national media (El Universo, Extra, TC Television, Ecuavisa), which are impor-
tant opinion makers and major cultural producers, have their bases in 
Guayaquil. This Guayaquil media elite has played a role in the ideological 
legitimation of the local Social Christian Party, led by Mayor Jaime Nebot 
(Franklin Ramírez Gallegos, interview, Quito, April 4, 2011). The retreat of the 
ideological defense of the market-based developmental model as it applied to 
the environment around Guayaquil, Ecuador’s most important economic 
region, corresponded to its loss of political influence on a national level in a 
political climate dominated by the Citizens’ Revolution and the emergence of 
a contrasting model of development based on the central role of the state 
(Eaton, 2011). These conflicting dynamics were further complicated by the fact 
that Correa is from Guayaquil and is disputing the legitimacy of those elites.
ConvergenCe
Correa has politicized the question of the mass media in Ecuador’s democ-
racy. Referring to them as “de facto powers,” he has called attention to their 
illegitimacy from a democratic point of view. Therefore, the Citizens’ 
Revolution’s refoundational discourse, which meant a confrontation with the 
elites and the “partidocracy” during the electoral campaign, included the 
media thereafter, making media system change an indispensable part of a 
transformed political order. Correa’s leadership has revived the traditional 
reformist debates concerning the desirable role of the state, the market, and the 
society in the sphere of the media (Waisbord, 2011: 99). Debating these ques-
tions became an attempt to reopen the discussion of the relationship of material 
and symbolic power in the area of the media, which constituted a direct chal-
lenge to the dominant actors.
Thus the Citizens’ Revolution appealed to and converged with the agendas 
and discourses of civil society and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 
human rights organizations, communication professionals, the communitarian 
or alternative media, unions, university intellectuals, faith-based groups, and 
other activist groups engaged with questions of democracy and reform and 
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linked with various components of the Ecuadorean left. A legacy of the discus-
sions on the New World Information and Communications Order and the 
McBride report, the concepts of communication rights and media democratiza-
tion point to a radical resignification of the traditional rights of freedom of 
expression and of the press, whose central tenet is noninterference by the state 
and the reforming of the institutional framework that sustains them (Jurado, 
2010: 240). Retreating at the end of the cold war, this epistemic community 
achieved a certain rearticulation in such forums as the World Summit on the 
Information Society and the World Social Forum (Jurado, 2010; Navas, 2011).
International networks had a transformative role in the sphere of communi-
cation as elsewhere in Ecuadorean civil society. During the past few decades, a 
series of international organizations focusing on communication were estab-
lished in Quito, among them the Centro Internacional de Estudios Superiores 
de Comunicación para América Latina (International Center for Advanced 
Studies in Communication for Latin America—CIESPAL), the Asociación 
Mundial de Radios Comunitarias (World Association of Community Radio 
Broadcasters), the Asociación Latinoamericana de Educación Radiofónica 
(Latin American Association for Radio Education), and the Organización 
Católica Latinoamericana y Caribeña de Comunicación (Latin American and 
Caribbean Catholic Organization for Communication). This situation gave rise 
to Quito’s being labeled the communication capital of Latin America, and it 
contributed to the development of a critical mass of professionals and activists 
closely connected to the debates circulating in the organizations established in 
Quito. This epistemic community had a certain influence on the critical sensi-
bility concerning media behavior in Quito’s (micro) cultural climate (Fernando 
Checa, interview, Quito, April 26, 2011).
With the rise of an increasing anti-neoliberal critique in the region at the 
beginning of the new century, these counterhegemonic discourses gained reso-
nance in the conflictive circumstances resulting from the crisis in the Washington 
Consensus. In the particular case of Ecuador, a series of exceptional experiences 
deepened the general discontent with the media and increased the potential 
bases for a reformist consensus. A consequence of the 1999–2000 crisis of the 
financial system, the so-called War of the Channels of 2004 and 2005 involved 
media controlled by the owners of the nation’s two major banking institutions. 
The Isaías Group media, whose owners were fugitives from justice as a result 
of the fraudulent bankruptcy of Filanbanco, and Teleamazonas, controlled by 
Fidel Egas, owner of the Bank of Pinchincha, converted their screens into a 
battlefield in a war of corporate interests. Open disinformation campaigns, 
leaks, and denunciations demonstrated the alignment between the owners’ 
interests and the editorial lines of these media (Reyes, 2010). The public percep-
tion of this instrumental use of the media influenced Correa’s various dis-
courses concerning them and the content of his government’s decisions and 
policies.
The mobilizations of 2005, which led to the overthrow of the government of 
Lucio Gutiérrez, crystallized another experience concerning the media as part 
of the power questioned by the urban masses mobilized in Quito. Barely visible 
in the mainstream media coverage, the novel collective action repertoire of the 
“outlaw” (forajido) protests depended for its coordination on an alternative 
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radio station (Radio La Luna) and the use of new technologies (Navas, 2011). 
According to Ramírez (2005: 55),
The cognitive limits and political-economic interests of the television channels 
were quite clearly shown by a coverage that never sought, or knew how, to 
show the magnitude, extension, and conviction of the citizens’ protest. . . . The 
citizenry, which played the leading role in the insurrection, realized that on 
television only the standpoints of the political barons were aired. . . . The reality 
shown on television was not the one that the people were living every night. 
The rejection of the stations expressed in threats to reporters and cameramen 
of the various media and the call for a boycott of them were among the unprec-
edented actions of the nights of April.
In 2007 the Citizens’ Revolution embraced the demand “Out with all of 
them!” of the 2005 mobilizations. Electoral necessity doubtless explains why 
the major media had no place alongside the “partidocracy” and “the long neo-
liberal night” in its campaign rhetoric. On taking office, having declared that 
what was won was an election, not power, and consistent with the strategy of 
not competing for legislative office, Correa called for a constituent assembly. 
This is when the real confrontation with the political parties in the National 
Assembly, the business elite, and the media began.
In the Constituent Assembly, the Alianza PAIS (Fatherland and Sovereignty 
Alliance—AP) obtained 80 of the 130 seats. The alliance included members 
of popular movements, social organizations, the old and new left, ordinary 
citizens, and professional politicians committed to the goal of transcending 
the neoliberal order and partisan domination (Larrea, 2009; Ramírez, 2010a). 
Because of their association with leftist members of the AP leadership, many 
writers, filmmakers, and celebrities with a leftist or reformist agenda—
among them Pilar Nuñez (a journalists’ union leader), Paco Velasco (from 
Radio La Luna), and the journalist María Augusta Calle—obtained seats 
(Larrea, 2009; Checa, interview). They functioned as liaisons with organiza-
tions associated with the alternative media and, with various levels of par-
ticipation, took the lead in drafting the constitution’s section on 
communication.
During the Constituent Assembly, the civil society organizations gathered 
around the Communication Forum, a network of professionals and trained 
activists that constituted a forum for proposals to the assembly, and one of 
several policy issue networks aimed at influencing the constitutional process 
(Ramírez, 2010a). The sympathy of Alberto Acosta, the president of the 
Constituent Assembly, with these agendas and the presence of assembly mem-
bers from the field of communications eased the advocacy work.3 Although 
certain sectors of the AP’s leadership perceived the importance of uniting and 
incorporating the communication sector, no clear directive emerged from it. 
The impetus appears to have come from a dynamic, sometimes dependent on 
personal relationships, internal to the assembly (Pilar Nuñez, interview, Quito, 
April 8, 2011). The discussion was not free of tensions and arguments that even-
tually led to fissures in the civil society sector.
But apart from these emerging disagreements, the opening up of the major-
ity bloc and the advocacy work of the civil society organizations were reflected 
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in the content about communication included in the constitution in October 
2008. With its post-neoliberal understanding, the new constitution established 
rights of communication and information (Article 16) and made the state an 
active agent in guaranteeing these rights. It explicitly prohibited any monopoly 
of communication and guaranteed the assignment, under conditions of equal-
ity, of parts of the broadcast spectrum to public, private, and community actors 
(Article 17). The public recognition of these sectors as actors is intertwined with 
its rationalization in terms of a social communication system (Article 384) ori-
ented toward equality of communication rights in harmony with the idea of 
“good living” (buen vivir). At the same time, the constitution prohibited the 
participation of financial institutions in the media (Article 312), reflecting the 
impact of recent experience. It defined the spectrum as a strategic sector and 
gave the state the authority to administer it (Article 313). Finally, it established 
directives for the transition to the new constitutional order, one of which 
required the executive branch to create a commission that would audit radio 
and television frequency licensees within a period of six months and another 
calling for the passage of an Organic Law on Communication within a year.
The InsTITuTIonal TransITIon
In the implementation of the constitutional directives, conflicts, tensions, 
and political constraints combined to render the institutional transition incon-
clusive.
The CommIssIon For audITIng ConCessIons oF radIo and TelevIsIon 
FrequenCIes
The Commission for Auditing Concessions of Radio and Television 
Frequencies, created in November 2008, was composed primarily of activists 
and professionals (some of them foreign) who were close to the Communication 
Forum along with telecommunications technicians.4 Its mission was to deter-
mine the constitutionality, legitimacy, and transparency of the frequency con-
cessions granted between 1995 and 2008, along with the existing monopolies 
and the involvement of financial groups in the media. Its report, which was to 
be presented within 180 days, was intended to be a fundamental contribution 
to the development of policy on modifying the media environment in accor-
dance with the new constitutional restrictions.
The commission’s investigation detected an enormous number of illegalities 
and procedural irregularities on the part of the license holders and the regula-
tory and control agencies (the Consejo Nacional de Radio y Televisión [National 
Radio and Television Council—CONARTEL] and the Superintendencia de 
Telecomunicaciones). Among them were violations surrounding the prohibi-
tion of the buying and selling of licenses through return and immediate recon-
cession, irregular extensions, disregard for the order of preference and 
discrimination among submissions, overlooking of requirements, and the 
assignment of licenses to members of the regulatory agency. The report estab-
lished that 40 percent of the concessions contained violations of the law or, at 
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the very least, questionable features and the presence of actors largely from or 
linked with the financial sector (CAF, 2009). These findings were evidence that 
concessions were routinely granted in exchange for political or private favors 
and that there was deep penetration of the regulatory agencies by the interests 
being regulated.
In May 2009 the full commission submitted its report to the president in a 
private meeting. As many of the individuals present testified, the report made 
Correa aware of the extent of the problem and the radical measures that would 
be needed to reverse the situation. With the aim of developing a legal and 
political strategy for this task, he set up an ad hoc group made up of some com-
mission members, legal advisers, and CONARTEL officers who were present 
at the meeting. These latter individuals, however, had already shown reluc-
tance about accepting the report and questioned the viability of a massive 
revoking of licenses (João Brant, interview, São Paulo, June 10, 2011; José Ignacio 
López Vigil, interview, Quito, April 25, 2011; Guillermo Navarro, interview, 
Quito, April 18, 2011). As a result, the report was never released.5 Legal and 
administrative subterfuge led to its replacement by a previous one from the 
comptroller general’s office that did not require such drastic steps.
Besides frustrating the expectations created by the report as a tool for restruc-
turing the media, this episode made evident that actors linked to the interests 
under investigation or supporters of ideological positions incompatible with 
media democratization were present in the government and other vital state 
positions. These conflicting views became apparent within the president’s own 
circle,6 among CONARTEL officials, and in government bodies like the comp-
troller general’s office and the district attorney’s office, revealing the presence 
within the government of a right wing as well as old and new media interests. 
The episode called attention to Correa’s pragmatism and to the constraints of 
civil society organizations as the basis for structural transformation. As one of 
the members of the commission observed, the normative critiques, cadres, and 
strategies provided by civil society organizations were of little help in counter-
acting the bureaucratic expertise and penetration that the established actors in 
the media sector enjoyed.
The organIC law on CommunICaTIon
The drafting of an Organic Law on Communication to replace the 1975 law 
was a tortuous process and, despite the one-year term set by the constitution, 
was finally sanctioned only in mid-2013. During this period the fissures and 
weaknesses of the sectors of civil society that had acted with relative unity dur-
ing the constituent process became evident. The legislative debate again exhib-
ited heterogeneity of ideas and interests, lack of cohesion, political constraints, 
and weakness in the conduct of the AP bloc.A month after the constitutional 
deadline for the approval of the law, an ad hoc committee composed of 11 
members and chaired by a legislator of the AP majority was created. The offi-
cialist bloc confused the civil society organizations of the Communication 
Forum with the presentation of a bill far from their agenda and drafted behind 
closed doors. Confronted with this fait accompli, a group keeping the name of 
the “forum” presented a radical and corporatist-flavored bill introduced by the 
8  LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
opposition indigenous assemblywoman Lourdes Tiban. Disagreeing with this 
tactic and with some of the bill’s content, a sector associated with CIESPAL that 
brought together organizations focused on rights and democratization estab-
lished the Citizens’ Collective for Communication Rights. Lacking legislative 
allies, the collective had no option but to present its draft in the form of input 
to a formal hearing of the committee.7
Behind these differences concerning tactics and policies of activism and alli-
ances, there were personality conflicts, organizational agendas, trade union 
interests in favor of professionalization, and different interpretations of the 
nature and reach of communication rights (Jurado, interview; Checa, inter-
view; Nuñez, interview). Furthermore, visible contradictions in the officialist 
bloc between the sectors that were most attached to the democratization of 
communication, on one side, and those linked to media interests or oriented 
toward satisfying the desires attributed to the executive, on the other, appeared 
on the ad hoc committee.8 Meanwhile, various high-profile opposition figures 
stood out for their denunciation of the government’s desire to control the 
media, which they saw as an issue that would provide them political gains. 
Among the divisive issues in the legislative debate, which extended to the AP 
bloc, were freedom of speech (and its limits), the creation of a communication 
council to regulate media content (its integration, its “autonomy,” and its reach 
and penalizing powers), the redistribution (and eventual revoking) of radio 
frequencies, the institutional structure of the public media, and the compulsory 
licensing of journalists.
Meanwhile, courting public opinion, the major media launched an aggres-
sive campaign aimed at creating the perception of an “assault on freedom of 
speech.” This concerted action, which reduced the regulatory objective to a 
“gag rule,” was emphatically countered in media interventions by the presi-
dent calling for an end to the excesses, abuses, and privileges of the press. This 
polarization of the public sphere made for a difficult debate, removing from 
center stage the demand for the democratization of the communication media 
and preventing a larger mobilization of social sectors to support the law 
(Betancourt, 2010; Ramos, 2010).9
Both the government-sponsored bill and the draft for the floor debate 
approved by the committee raised criticism not only for their technical incon-
sistencies but, fundamentally, for their controversial content. Concerns emerged 
from certain sectors of civil society about excessive zeal in the control of media 
content, and these voices mobilized critical declarations from some interna-
tional organizations. The legislative draft received critical accounts and reports 
from institutions like the OAS, the UN, and UNESCO, primarily questioning 
the aspects relating to freedom of speech.10 At the same time, the civil society 
organizations issued important warnings about inadequacies, omissions, and 
ambiguities with regard to media concentration, the regulation of the radio 
band, and the equitable redistribution of licenses, subject to—in the defini-
tions—the available space in the broadcast spectrum (López, interview).11
After a first stage of uneven work in the committee, the numerous doubts 
and disagreements within AP suggested that the project would be shelved. 
This led to the National Assembly president’s intervening to try to achieve an 
agreement that would set the guidelines for the discussion. This Ethical-Political 
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Agreement, subscribed to by all of the blocs by the end of 2009, obligated 
them to adhere to inter-American standards regarding freedom of speech and 
the creation of a communication council. However, the disqualification of the 
agreement by the president contributed to the continuation of the impasse 
throughout 2010.
In the subsequent context of the September 30, 2010, crisis (known as 30-S), 
the government initiated a referendum for May 2011 in which 2 of the 10 ques-
tions referred to the communication issue, seeking to reopen the discussion of 
the law. Question 9, which sought approval for the creation of a council to 
regulate media content, won by a slim majority (44.98 percent for and 42.02 
percent against). This opened a new round of legislative debate. Question 3 
amended the constitution (44 percent yes, 42 percent no) by extending the ban 
on media ownership established by the 2008 Constitution from banks to all 
nonmedia enterprises. Consequently, a new legislative process was open for 
the submission by the government of a bill that would provide guidelines for 
disinvestment and limit the proportion of shareholder participation in the 
national media by owners of other businesses to 6 percent.12
The realpolITIk oF The CITIzens’ revoluTIon
Parallel to the tortuous advance of the legal transition, the Citizens’ 
Revolution launched a series of counterhegemonic processes and decisions in 
the media sphere. In the nuances of these policies one can observe simultane-
ously the radicalism and the constraints of the political process initiated by 
Correa.
This realpolitik had two aspects. One aspect was the development of policies 
that affect the distribution of power in the media. The Citizens’ Revolution 
touched upon property relations, revamped the state’s role, and fostered mar-
ket alternative logics in the media sector. The other aspect was the creation of 
governmental direct communication devices, centered on the figure of the 
president, oriented toward the dispute of the public agenda and the struggle to 
interpret the meaning of events.
redIsTrIbuTIon oF medIa power
The alteration of the political economy of the media sector and the balance 
of symbolic power is a consequence of various initiatives. On the one hand, 
the Citizens’ Revolution launched offensives that affected ownership, espe-
cially of the media that were linked to the banks, and the business structure in 
the commercial media sector. On the other hand, it placed the state in a pri-
mary role with the creation of public media and offered incentives—despite 
mutual distrust and misunderstandings—to other social forces to engage in 
media activities.
When the constitutional deadline ended after two years in October 2010, 
Fidel Egas, the owner of the Bank of Pichincha had to transfer his shares in 
Teleamazonas, one of the two free-to-air channels with the largest audiences 
and coverage. Forty-eight percent of the shares were distributed among 
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employees through credits from the bank itself, 30 percent went to Peruvian 
(the La República Group) and Spanish entrepreneurs, and the rest was put into 
a trust. The involvement of Egas’s direct family members in the trust led the 
National Assembly to question the changes in regulations made by the 
Superintendencia de Bancos, which relaxed the degrees of kinship (from four 
to two) admitted in the control of a business, thereby violating the constitu-
tional intent of not leaving bankers in control of the media. In opposition to this 
lack of administrative transparency and suspected corporate pressure, in 
October 2010 the assembly president called for a return to the constitutional 
road and achieved the annulment of the controversial modifications. 
Nevertheless, doubts concerning the real ownership of the channel persisted. 
Teleamazonas had previously been responsible for a series of incidents linked 
to oppositional coverages that were at odds with journalistic ethics (the most 
important being the cases of the “clandestine polling headquarters” and the 
island of Puná), exposing it to both administrative proceedings and sanctions 
that the channel decried as political persecution. Its radically oppositional tone 
did not appear to have substantially changed with the change in ownership. 
Nevertheless, the pressure to sell forced the company to rid itself of the most 
notorious and recalcitrant anti-correista individuals for reducing its value.13
More important in terms of the shift in power was the confiscation of the 
media outlets belonging to the Isaías Group. This company, one of Ecuador’s 
major economic groups, with a base in Guayaquil, owned Filanbanco, which 
was fraudulently declared bankrupt during the financial crisis of 1999. In the 
interest of the defrauded shareholders, in July 2008 the Deposit Guarantee 
Agency seized 195 businesses of the group, among them 2 of the 5 most impor-
tant open national television stations (TC Televisión of Guayaquil and 
Gamavisión of Quito). Transmitted live by the confiscated channels themselves, 
this daring move against one of the members of the economic establishment 
had the character of a state action—the announcement of it brought together 
the principal institutional authorities—and, while it received widespread pop-
ular support (Arosemena, 2010; Ramírez, interview), led to the resignation of 
the minister for economic affairs, indicating a certain anxiety among the 
“center-right” sectors of the governmental coalition (Ramírez, 2010b).
The confiscated stations retained their audience and their ratings by main-
taining the bulk of their programming and their communication agenda. As a 
matter of fact, there was a deliberate decision not to alter the cultural content. 
Instead there was a shift in information focus and in editorial line (Ayala and 
Calvache, 2009; Fundamedios, 2010). Some journalists left, and two public 
affairs programs aligned ideologically with the “Guayaquil” model of free 
enterprise and autonomy vis-à-vis Quito were withdrawn (Reyes, 2010).
The confiscation was part of a broader transformation of the social power 
matrix in a process of realignment of institutional, political, and communica-
tion resources that allowed for the wholesale reconfiguration of power relation-
ships. Through the confiscation Correa diminished the power resources of the 
private channels, not only reducing their communication space in the public 
sphere but also reducing the government’s detractors’ influence on the public. 
Displaying political realism, the government did not get rid of those channels 
despite initial promises (Ramírez, 2010b).
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Beyond the cases related to the delegitimized media power of the banks, the 
government adopted other initiatives that affected the private sector. In 2009 it 
prohibited public contracts with companies that had established residence in 
tax havens, obligating some of the principal media holdings to provide lists of 
their owners and shareholders in order to retain the right to obtain government 
advertising. At the same time, being the primary advertiser, the government 
slowly reoriented the official advertising expenditures to favor the confiscated 
media. The media companies appear to have registered important reductions 
in income from state and private advertising during this period (Fundamedios, 
2010). These initiatives surprised the internally divided business groups, espe-
cially in the television sector, a fact that eased the government’s early offensive. 
Only with the discussion of the communication law did the business groups 
react in a more or less coordinated manner although with a defensive and rad-
icalized position (Fundamedios, 2010).
Outside of these advances that profited from the fissured legitimacy and the 
circumstantial organizational weakness of the media establishment, the policy 
in relation to broadcast frequencies demonstrated the constraints indicated by 
the report of the auditing commission. The expectation of an equitable distribu-
tion (in the three equal parts, state, nonprofit, and for-profit, demanded by the 
civil society organizations) of the spectrum, which until then had been under 
the hegemony of the private commercial sector, was not fulfilled. At the end of 
2010 the government awarded a concession of 14 radio frequencies to indige-
nous organizations and developed measures to provide equipment, consul-
tants, and training (in a joint program with CIESPAL) to those communities 
(UNESCO, 2011). Besides this allocation (viewed with suspicion by the benefi-
ciaries) and a number of permits for new public media, there appear to have 
been a few license reversions in connection with irregularities.
These constraints appear to have originated in bureaucratic inertia and the 
continued colonization of the regulatory agencies by private interests that per-
petuated the intense politicization of the media order by the Citizens’ 
Revolution. Until mid-2009 the head of CONARTEL was Jorge Yunda, a lead-
ing business representative of the practices denounced by the auditing com-
mission. Once this conflict of interest was made public, he finally handed in his 
resignation. The government then attempted a bureaucratic reorganization by 
abolishing CONARTEL and incorporating some of its duties into new agencies 
that were under the jurisdiction of the new Ministry of Telecommunications. 
These changes do not appear to have contributed to a significant change in 
personnel, however, since they affected technicians, especially engineers, on 
whom the radio and television operations depended.
The Citizens’ Revolution’s public media creation policy signified a radical 
change. Until then, the Ecuadorean experience with public broadcasting had 
been limited to the weak experiment with Ecuadorean National Radio. In 2007 
the inaugural broadcast of public television, Ecuador TV, transmitted the open-
ing of the Constituent Assembly. In 2008 Ecuador Public Radio was resurrected 
and El Telégrafo, based on a traditional Guayaquil newspaper that had been 
confiscated in 2002 from another banker, was relaunched as a public newspa-
per. The presence of these new media and others such as the digital newspaper 
El Ciudadano, the tabloid PP, and the Andes news agency introduced voices and 
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content that had been excluded by the commercial, political, and cultural logics 
of the private media. This expansion was recognized even by those critical of 
the government (Ayala and Calvache, 2009; Fundamedios, 2010; UNESCO, 
2011). At the same time, many civil society organizations sympathetic to the 
Citizens’ Revolution agenda remained critical of the governmental slant of the 
news programs (Jurado, interview; Checa, interview).
This unprecedented experiment was confronted with cultural, technical, 
professional, and political constraints and challenges. Historically, it was the 
private media that provided media content in Ecuador. An indicator of the 
naturalization of this order is the large percentage of the population that still 
confuses the new public media with the private commercial stations (Ayala and 
Calvache, 2009). In contrast with the confiscated media, the new public media 
have a very limited audience. Furthermore, the infrastructure of the state media 
is incipient; Ecuador TV, for example, received a wide-ranging VHF channel 
only in 2011. Another problem concerns the professional culture. The majority 
of the journalists, technicians, operators, and managers that compose the pub-
lic media staffs come from the private media and have been socialized in their 
perspectives and biases (Raquel Escobar, interview, Quito, April 6, 2011; Carol 
Murillo, interview, Quito, April 24, 2011; Orlando Pérez, interview, Quito, April 
25, 2011; Giovanna Tassi, interview, Quito, April 12, 2011). Institutional hetero-
geneity and weakness can also be seen in the use in public radio and television 
(RTVPEcuador) of an ISO 9001 certified management system, an established 
standard oriented toward optimization of productivity and other market goals. 
Many of those responsible for the journalistic content and the construction of 
the public media are experiencing the tension between civic imperatives and 
the immediacy of the conflict between the government and the private media 
(Tassi, interview; Murillo, interview; Pérez, interview; Escobar, interview). At 
the same time, certain key roles, for example, the management of the confis-
cated and public media, have been granted to boards that were not linked to 
the Citizens’ Revolution ideologically—that stemmed from the president’s 
coastal connections and were deeply immersed in the business culture.
Taken together, the sum of all of these policy initiatives and orientations 
appears to have resulted in a weakening of the dominant voices and in an open-
ing for viewpoints and discourses that had previously been absent in the pub-
lic sphere. It appears to have provoked a displacement in the form of a novel 
legitimacy of alternative logics to the commercial and private media logics that 
had previously been hegemonic.
The CreaTIon oF CounTerhegemonIC governmenTal devICes
Given the weakness of the other institutional spheres, “during the period of 
the Citizens’ Revolution the mass media has become the principal arena of 
political struggle” (Ramírez, 2010b). Consequently, the government has grad-
ually constructed a series of direct communication devices centered on the 
figure of Correa as the leading spokesman and leader.14 From the beginning 
radio and television broadcasts were established from which the president 
was able to consolidate a “space of personal visibility” and unmediated dis-
course. The signals for these transmissions, offered free, are voluntarily 
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retransmitted by a significant important number of community radio stations 
and by commercial stations given the audience they provide (Reyes, inter-
view). At the same time, as stipulated by the 1975 law, there was regular use 
of broadcast chains to interrupt radio and television programming in order to 
refute the assertions of journalists and anchors on the air (Reyes, 2010). Within 
this wide-ranging presidential communicative space, counterdiscourse and 
systematic critical questioning of mass media institutions occupied a primary 
focus. On Saturdays there was a regular segment called “Freedom of Speech 
Now Belongs to Everyone” that was dedicated to questioning and decon-
structing discourses, refuting assertions, and calling attention to inaccuracies 
and biases in the press.
Correa’s discourse on the media merits systematic study. Two critical per-
spectives can be distinguished in his denunciation of the media as “de facto 
powers.” The one connected to the demands of civil society and the left, as we 
have seen, is the assertion of the antidemocratic nature of the media’s power 
and the promise to redistribute that power. The other, disturbing to these 
same allies for both normative and prudential reasons, tends to identify the 
confrontation between the media and the government as the fundamental 
antagonism.
The “war” with the media began in March 2007 in the context of the coverage 
of the conflict between the executive and legislative branch regarding the con-
stitutional reform. The major newspapers, La Hora and El Universo, branded the 
governmental initiatives taken to overcome the impasse illegitimate and crim-
inal. Correa responded by suing them for slander, condemning journalists on 
camera, and characterizing the press as dishonest, miserable, and corrupt. For 
their part, the major national media, en bloc, under the influence of institutions 
like the Inter-American Press Association, presented the media conflict simply 
as a function of the government’s desire to silence the press (Reyes, 2010). This 
mode of confrontation was present, with some fluctuations, from that moment 
on, but with the 30-S police insurrection it reached new heights. The same day 
the government decreed that an uninterrupted chain be made available because 
of the fear of destabilizing coverage. In the subsequent polemic on the nature 
of the insurrection, a column in El Universo that branded Correa a dictator and 
charged him with ordering the authorities to fire at will on a hospital full of 
innocent people and civilians led to civil and criminal prosecutions of the col-
umnist and the newspaper.15 These reactions are intelligible in the framework 
of the president’s perception of the media as pursuing their interests outside of 
any institutional boundaries. For Correa, the media powers were using their 
symbolic capabilities in a praetorian manner, without any limits, as is sug-
gested by the frequent expression “hired assassins with a pen” (sicarios de tinta). 
This position represents a historical pattern in the president’s view (Correa, 
2011, my emphasis):
This is the history of Latin America, not only that of Ecuador. Examine the his-
tory of Alfaro, the editorials of the newspapers El Comercio and La Prensa. 
Concerning him (Alfaro) they said: “Crush the serpent.” The daily El Comercio 
treated him in this manner, with this detestable name, inciting the population to 
massacre and the barbaric bonfire. Are the people of Quito assassins? The people 
of Quito were encouraged and manipulated by the corrupt conservative press. 
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History repeats itself, and this is one of the challenges of Latin America: creating 
a more decent press that works for the common good, fulfilling its responsibil-
ity of providing information rather than engaging in secret political agendas 
or character assassination of a person’s reputation and integrity through print.
These naked, irresponsible, and “seditious” powers confront Correa with a 
problem regarding freedom of expression and its limits. Along with some of his 
supporters, the president defends the state’s duty to sanction and regulate 
these behaviors. This tendency was demonstrated in the heteronomous posi-
tions of the ruling party regarding the regulation of content in the legislative 
debates. It was also displayed in the consensus of AP sectors concerning the 
political legitimacy and necessity of civil and criminal prosecution of abuses of 
the freedom of expression.
The polITICal-sTruCTural lImITs oF  
The CITIzens’ revoluTIon
Without a doubt, the Citizens’ Revolution will be remembered as a striking 
experiment in creating counterhegemonic media. The political process led by 
Correa has changed the relations of symbolic communicative power and media 
ownership, introduced regulation, demystified media discourse, and broken 
up the domination of the market as the guiding principle in the media. 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the equitable redistribution of media 
power advocated by the Citizens’ Revolution, it is still an open process whose 
outcome is uncertain. For ideas to be effectively transformed into policy, they 
must not only be present on the level of the political elite but also be embedded 
in institutions and—finally—exist as shared societal ideologies and beliefs 
(Sikkink, 1991). This distinction is useful for classifying observations concern-
ing the limits, difficulties, and contradictions of the Citizens’ Revolution as it 
attempts to democratize the mass media.
The elITe and The polITICal leadershIp
The president himself, as we have seen, carries heteronomous viewpoints 
and practical orientations regarding the media and communication. As has any 
political leader, he has been shaped by contradictory personal, social, and polit-
ical experiences,16 and his agendas cannot be expected to be consistent and 
ideologically pure. The heterogeneity of the interests and ideas regarding the 
media that coexist in the Citizens’ Revolution coalition influences its media 
policy. The AP contains not only different expressions of the highland left but 
also sectors of the center-right and middle-class sectors marginalized from 
institutional power, with roots in the followers of Abdalá Bucaram, that are 
associated with the populist political culture of the coast. This diversity is 
reflected in the core of the government, in the legislative bloc, and among AP 
leaders in general, many of whom have strong ties with media interests in their 
regions. Key positions are occupied by individuals linked to established inter-
ests, whose ideas on the media are more business- than politically oriented and 
who are therefore indifferent to the democratizing agenda. For example, the 
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brothers Vinicio and Fernando Alvarado, the sons of a radio station owner from 
Los Ríos and associated with private business in communication and advertis-
ing, are in charge of communication and media policy in Carondelet. Enrique 
Arosemena Robles, a member of one of Guayaquil’s powerful traditional fam-
ilies and nephew of the owner of Ecuavisa (a station where he attained his 
professional experience as engineer and manager), was in charge of the public 
radio and television media and those that had been confiscated (Arosemena, 
2010). These individuals generally come from Correa’s pre-political social circle 
and his coastal base.17
This divergence of interests, combined with a certain lack of expertise on the 
technicalities of communications and the weaknesses of the legislative work, 
help to explain the impossibility of a cohesive position for the AP’s legislative 
bloc. Along these lines, one must point to the politico-organizational weakness 
of the Citizens’ Revolution, reflecting the choice of a kind of electoral mobiliza-
tion from above based on a technocratic-marketing model (Ramírez, 2010b).
InsTITuTIons
On the institutional level one can observe not only lack of skills and bureau-
cratic inertia but also the difficulties in the attempts to reverse the historical 
colonization of the state by business interests. The civil society organization 
network—a “state within a state” supported by international cooperation—
linked to media change did not develop the technical-political cadres neces-
sary for the creation of an alternative policy community to sustain structural 
change. Although numerous critically committed professionals have editorial 
responsibility in the new public media, many of the executives come from the 
business world, while in the newsrooms a professional culture molded in the 
private media dominates. As public media executives themselves acknowl-
edge, journalistic autonomy clashes with the immediacy of polarized politics, 
while the development of professional training programs is only in its initial 
stages.
In the arena of community media, an effective redistribution of expression 
power beyond spectrum reserves is dependent on access to financial and orga-
nizational resources. There has been some state support for infrastructure, 
financing, and training, but the results and continuation of these initiatives are 
at the mercy of the government’s tense relations with the social movements.
The most obvious constraints occur in the bureaucratic agencies that regulate 
the telecommunications sector. Essentially composed of engineers and techni-
cians, they have not been amenable to the agenda of media democratization. 
Confronting them and separated by an epistemological rupture are the sociolo-
gists, communication theorists, and jurists with a political vision and agenda for 
balancing rights for this sector (Ortega, interview). At the same time, the staff of 
the new Ministry of Telecommunications includes many of the old managerial 
and technical bureaucrats of the regulatory, administrative, and controller orga-
nizations of the broadcast spectrum. It is very difficult for political power to 
penetrate bureaucratic control in these very specialized agencies. The engineers 
they employ have historical links with the business sector. Throughout its 13 
years, the CONARTEL board has been primarily composed of licensees or direct 
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business representatives as well as numerous representatives of the armed 
forces, historically intertwined with certain business interests (CIESPAL, 2011).
In Ecuador in contrast to some of its neighbors, advances regarding network 
regulation and the transition to digital technology in television have been timid 
and tentative (Valeria Betancourt, interview, Quito, April 19, 2011). The pend-
ing decisions in these convergent camps will have important consequences for 
the future of the political economy of communication and information. Agencies 
like the Ministry of Telecommunications have become key areas for struggles 
that will largely shape the institutionalization of the Ecuadorean media.
The soCIeTy
An important social constraint of media reform agendas is that they are 
bound to appeal to Ecuador’s rather narrow urban sectors. Outside of Quito, 
the functioning of the media seems not to be perceived as a major problem. A 
2009 survey found that 58.01 percent of respondents in Guayaquil considered 
the media honest in contrast to 34.67 percent in Quito and 45.35 percent in the 
country as a whole (UNESCO, 2011). Increasingly, the popular sectors on the 
coast are a vital part of AP’s base, and this constituency is sensitive to cultural 
themes and rituals in which the demand for the democratization of communi-
cation is not important.
For their part, circumscribed by the coincidence of the Citizens’ Revolution 
with a decline in mobilization (Ramírez, 2010a), civil society organizations 
committed to the democratization of communication have been unable to 
mobilize broader social support. While they were successful in influencing the 
constituent assembly, in the subsequent phase they were placed on the defen-
sive given their internal fragmentation and their feeling of having been stripped 
of their agenda by government. There was tension between the institutional 
criteria they promoted (autonomy from the market and the state, citizen par-
ticipation, inclusion of silenced voices, and identity, among other things) and 
fear of instrumentalization or control from above given the top-down policy 
construction dominant in the Citizens’ Revolution. At the same time, Correa 
did not question tout court the legitimacy of business activity in the media 
field. The confrontation with the commercial media must be viewed as part of 
a much wider struggle to limit the political influence of specific business, bank-
ing, and family networks, especially those from Guayaquil (Ramírez, 2010b). 
The Citizens’ Revolution’s initial advances benefited from the weakened col-
lective action capacity of the factionalized business interests, but by the time of 
the legislative discussion the sector had recovered significant coordination, as 
evidenced by the aggressive press campaign against the law.
Judging from the results of the referendum of May 2010, the battle for hearts 
and minds appears to reflect these fluctuations and nuances. On the new com-
munication law the “yes” vote was the smallest for any of the 10 questions 
while the “no” vote was almost on a par with the largest. Among the middle 
sectors of Quito—the group that was in the streets in 2005—the “yes” vote 
appears to have been in the minority. The struggle for the distribution of power 
in the media arena is not over. Given the government’s actions since the refer-
endum, it does not appear that the struggle will be relegated to the background.
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auThor noTe
The final version of this article, submitted in February 2012, is an analysis of 
events that took place through the middle of 2011.
noTes
 1. The 1975 law had already naturalized the commercial understandings of this sector (Jurado, 
2010; Navas, 2011), in contrast to the experience of the radical media reformism associated with 
Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru.
 2. In contrast to other Latin American countries, except for the presence of the Prisa and 
González groups the participation of transnational capital in the media sector has not been sig-
nificant.
 3. Acosta was from Radio La Luna’s advisory group, and this contributed to his sensitivity to 
the issue. “When we were in Montecristi he was still there, and he gave us direction during the 
writing of the articles” (José Ignacio López Vigil, interview, Quito, April 25, 2011).
 4. Guillermo Navarro, the commission chair, is a leftist planner educated in Czechoslovakia. 
In 2006 he published a study on media concentration called Los poderes fácticos (The Factual 
Powers), and Correa adopted the expression to characterize the media.
 5. It was Fundamedios, an NGO critical of the government, that put the report in circulation 
through a request for access to public information.
 6. The individuals most often mentioned are Vinicio and Fernando Alvarado, in charge of 
communication and media policy, and Alexis Mera, legal secretary of the Presidency.
 7. Various academics and specialists in communication were consulted, if only unsystemati-
cally, throughout the legislative debate. Their influence was considerably less than during the 
constituent process (Romel Jurado, interview, Quito, April 11, 2011; Reyes, 2010: 171).
 8. Rolando Panchana, author of the government-sponsored bill and a former television host, 
was idiosyncratically distanced from the media democratization agenda. Betty Carrillo, the first 
chair of the committee, was strongly criticized for her performance and her closeness to the right-
ist sectors of the executive branch.
 9. In Argentina, in contrast, despite a similar media campaign there was massive mobilization 
in support of the media law passed in 2009.
10. This is another relevant difference with Argentina, whose media law was not questioned 
but instead received praise on the part of those organizations.
11. There was a warning about this heteronomy later when the administration of the spectrum 
and licenses were later included in a bill drafted far from public scrutiny in the Ministry of 
Telecommunications. This legislative-regulatory distinction between telecommunication and 
communication was said to favor the bureaucratic domination of the spectrum rather than adopt-
ing citizens’ standards in communication policy (Julia Ortega, interview, Quito, April 27, 2011; 
López, interview).
12. The operative definition of “national media” is full of consequences for the structure of 
ownership in the sector.
13. Ramírez (interview) sees here the breakdown of old alliances and structures of media 
power.
14. These counterdiscourse measures centered on the figure of the president are a contrast 
with the Argentine case. In its counterhegemonic offensive, Kirchnerism appears to have drawn 
on resources from a diversified cultural media field that was not available to the Citizens’ 
Revolution.
15. Recently, the first criminal and compensatory verdicts were handed down, followed by the 
self-exile of the columnist in Miami.
16. The Citizens’ Revolution was preceded by a period of governmental instability and by a 
growing antipolitical climate that was significantly reinforced by the major media (Navas, 
2011).
17. Arosemena knew Correa from his participation in Christian youth circles, but he achieved 
the post through the efforts of the Alvarado brothers (Arosemena, 2010).
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